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THE WARSAW TICKET
TO JUDICIAL TREATY REVISION
-WILL WE DO IT AGAIN?
THOMAS W. REBILLY *
INTRODUCTION
T HE "Warsaw ticket,"" the international air carriers'
ticket to extremely limited liability exposure, was rec-
ognized in its early years as an automatic, judicially-sup-
ported international carte blanche limitation on air disaster
damage costs. When actuarialized against the steadily
decreasing number of fatal airline accidents per one
hundred million passenger miles,2 it reduced the annual
liability exposure of individual airline companies to con-
siderably less than the average annual cost of merely
maintaining their operating equipment, not including actual
replacement or purchase of new aircraft.' Even more graph-
* Senior Trial Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington,
D.C.; B.A., 1954, St. John's University; LL.B., 1956, St. John's University
School of Law; Member of the New York State Bar.
The opinions contained in this article are strictly those of the writer,
and they are in no way intended to represent the views or official positions
of the Federal Aviation Administration nor of the United States Government.
This paper was presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Laws at the George Washington University Graduate
School of Public Law.
1 Warsaw Convention, open for signature, Oct 29, 1929, 49 Stat 3000,
T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, Article III: Passenger Ticket.
2The fatality rate in 1929 was 45 per 100 million passenger miles,
and this steadily diminished to 0.55 per 100 million passenger miles in 1965.
At the same time, total volume of revenue operations multiplied tremen-
dously, as did the passenger-carrying capacity of commercial airliners.
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention,
80 H.Av. L. Rav. 497, 498 n.3 (1967) ; 1965 AxNuAL REPO T OF THE ICAO
CoUNccl. To ICAO ASSEMBLY 13; XII-4 CrvIL AERONAUTICS BoAD AmR
CARuIER FINANCIAL STATIsTICs 1 (1965).
8 Total cost of flying operations for the calendar year 1964, for U.S.
certificated route air carriers was $1,029,893,000; direct maintenance costs
were $467,243,000; indirect maintenance cost were $282,125,000; total revenues
for excess baggage were $27,823,000. CIVI AER=oAuTIcs BoARD Am
CARMR FINANCIAL STATISTTCS 1 (period ending Dec. 31, 1964). Total
judgments and settlements in Warsaw fatality cases were in the amount
of $114,000, and for non-Warsaw cases were $1,763,000, both for calendar
year 1964. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note Z, at 554.
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ically, the total recovery for fatality cases, both by way of
judgment and settlement, was only a small fraction of the
amount U.S. carriers received as revenue for "excess bag-
gage." The Warsaw Convention liability limitation of
125,000 "Poincare francs"--approximately 8,291-was low
even in 1929 " but was deliberately so in the international
interest of rapid development and expansion of international
air transportation. The members of the two international
conferences (Paris-1925, Warsaw-1929) and particularly
the CITEJA I recognized that aviation was in its infancy
and had tremendous potential, but that it would be slow
getting off the ground if those with the necessary capital
could not be protected against financial disaster resulting
from a single airline catastrophe. Many other grounds for
limitation of liability of air carriers have been advanced
including a comparison with the statutory devices affording
global limitations on the liability of shipowners under
maritime law.'
There can be little doubt that the Warsaw Convention
liability limitation has yielded the desired results in terms
of an expansion of international air transportation to an
extent undreamed of by even the forward-looking experts
in the CITEJA created by the 1925 Paris Conference.
Attraction of capital and safe-guarding of miniscule assets
are no longer the worrisome considerations for today's
behemoth airline corporations that they were in 1929 or in
4The U.S. dollar equivalent of $8,291.87 has been in effect since
devaluation of the U.S. dollar in 1933. Prior to that and at the time
of the Warsaw Convention (1929), the American equivalent was $4,899.
GThe interim Conit International Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens
was formed in 1926 as a result of the Paris Conference of 1925. Although
the United States was not represented at the conference, it sent an observer.
The CITEJA, consisting of a group of persons appointed by their respective
governments, met frequently between 1926 and 1939, and contributqd signifi-
cantly to many international aviation law conferences, particularly to the
drafting and signing of the Warsaw Convention in 1929, "relating to the
unification of certain rules governing international carriage by air," and
to the Rome Convention of 1933 relating to ground damage caused by
aircraft. ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization created as
a result of the Chicago Conference of 1944, now has its Legal Committee
performing some of the functions performed by CITEJA prior to World
War II. D. BILyzou, Am LAw 11-12, 124 (2d ed. 1964).OH. Daiow, Li2rrATiON OF LLLBmrrms iN INTERNATrONAL Am LAW
1, 3 (1954); Lowenfdld & Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 499.
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the Thirties when this was a struggling, infant industry.
The promotional preferential treatment of international air
carriers by artificially-imposed limits to their actual legal
liability for damages is no longer socially or economically
justified. The American courts in recent years have
squirmed uncomfortably in the sack-cloth of Convention-
created liability limits in the face of three major socio-
economic facts of life that are radically different today than
they were in the early years of international air trans-
portation. The first factor-the tremendous financial
strength of the major international air carriers today-we
have already mentioned. The major international carriers
are well able to assume the burden of full legal liability
to the same extent as all other major business corporations.
For those that cannot do so with their own capital, rea-
sonable insurance rates are available for all or any part
of the load. The second factor, the desired expansion, has
been accomplished, and neither rain nor sleet nor headline-
size lawsuit judgments can be expected to in any way retard
the tremendous growth in airline operations and prosperity
that is conservatively predicted for the future into and
including the Supersonic Transport era. The third factor
is the vast escalation in the cost of living of Americans
and others and the consequent lowering of the value of
the dollar-with the result that $8,300 today will some-
times not completely cover the replacement cost of a
decedent's luxury automobile much less reimburse his
widow for the monetary value of his life. The result is
that the "underdog" position has changed. In the public's
mind, "Infant Airlines" have become "Gigantic Airlines
International," and the litigious passenger's estate repre-
sentative presumably bent on bankrupting a struggling air-
line with a single lawsuit has become, instead, the classic
victimized widow and orphan who will be reimbursed with
"pennies" for the loss of the breadwinner.7
7 See, for example, page 39 of the NACCA Bar Association's position
paper, dated Nov. 10, 1961, regarding the Warsaw limitations, submitted
by Stuart M. Speiser, Esq., to the IGIA during its September-December,
1961 pre-hearing public comment period. Attachment 65 to IGIA 23/1.3,
"Warsaw Convention & Hague Protocol Proceedings," Public Docket Section,
Office of the General Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration.
[ VoL.. 43
THE WARSAW TICKET
Thus, as might be expected, just as there were many
arguments advanced as to the importance and need for
liability limitations in the Twenties--the early days of
commercial aviation, so it came to pass that in the Fifties
and Sixties we began to hear a long line of arguments for
eliminating the limitations. In December 1961 there was
a meeting 8 of the Interagency Group on International
Aviation 9 in the New State Department Building, Washing-
ton, D.C., with FAA Administrator Najeeb Bialaby as chair-
man, convened to consider the relationship of the United
States to the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol,
and many of the arguments against the Convention's liability,
limitations (advocating either raising the limits by ratifying
the Hague Protocol or renouncing Warsaw completely)
were presented by bar associations, leading negligence trial
attorneys, trial lawyers' associations, law professors, and
representatives of other interested groups. Top level rep-
resentatives of the Departments of Defense, Labor, Com-
merce, Justice, the State Department and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board participated. The issues, as posed by Mr.
Halaby on the first day of the oral presentations, were
"whether or not the Secretary of State should recommend
that the President withdraw the request to the Senate for
advice and consent to the Hague Protocol" and "secondly,
whether or not the United States should withdraw from
participation in the Warsaw Convention." "0 In his open-
ing statement Chairman flalaby acknowledged that, based
upon written comments submitted to the public docket
opened on the subject some three months prior to the
hearing, "the central criticism we have received is the
sSee 'Warsaw Convention & Hague Protocol Proceedings," Mtpra
note 7.
9The Presidentfs Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA)
is composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Commerce and
Defense, the Federal Aviation Administration (formerly Federal Aviation
Agency), and the Civil Aeronautics Board. Exec. Order No. 10883, 3 C.F.R.
414 (1960) terminating the Air Coordinating Committee (AGC) and pro-
viding for the establishment of IGIA by the FAA Administrator pursuant
to the Federal Aviation Act, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
(1964).
10 "Warsaw Convention & Hague Protocol Proceedings," supra note 7,
at 2.
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limited liability with respect to passengers for death or per-
sonal injury where willful conduct cannot be proved... this
seems to be the most controversial aspect of the Conven-
tion." 1  As an eventual result of the IGIA proceedings
chaired by FAA Administrator Halaby, several years of
receiving comments from interested parties, recommenda-
tions to Congress, and the later Senate hearings on the
same subject," it became obvious that a radical change in
the Convention liability limitation, insofar as United States
participation was concerned, was imminent.
Meanwhile, as sort of a second front, in view of the
changing conditions, American courts in recent years have
gone to great lengths to effect a sort of "judicial treaty
revision," to accord substantial justice, in the face of lia-
bility limitations that the courts and even the U.S. Depart-
ment of State"3 had come to feel were unconscionable and
unnecessary. The favorite target for the U.S. courts' avoid-
ance of the Convention limits has been the form of the
"Warsaw ticket" itself. The courts have dug deep for what
the author believes to be artificial distinctions surrounding
the ticket notice, in a concededly well-meaning desire to
offset the present-day unreasonableness of the liability limi-
tation-distinctions found in everything from the type and
time of "delivery" of the ticket, to the size of its printing,
the apparent or not so apparent meaning of what it says,
what the Convention "really meant" by delivery, what the
"real purpose" of the ticket and notice are, what the "average
person" would believe after reading the Warsaw Convention
notice on the ticket, etc., ad absurdum. All this in the face
-"Id. at 3.
12 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings in May, 1965, Chairman
Senator Fulbright. Hearings on the Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965). The final Senate Committee report recommended ratification of the
Hague Protocol, but only if a compulsory insurance bill were to be enacted
by Congress, and if not, then recommended that the State Department
denounce, formally, both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol.
S. Exec. Rep. No. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965).
Is State Department memorandum, July 26, 1961, prepared by Assistant
Legal Advisor Ely Maurer, advising FAA Administrator Najeeb Halaby
that the State Department had serious questions concerning the desirability
of the Warsaw Convention liability limitation, even with the proposed
increase to $16,600 that would be effected by ratifying the Hague Protocol.
[ VOL.. -43
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of the fact of life that the standard "Warsaw ticket notice"
has been substantially unchanged through all the millions
of international tickets sold and all the years that trans-
pired from the time American courts uniformly held that
the ticket notice, its printing, form, contents, etc., were
"legally sufficient" 14 to allow operation of the Convention
limitation, up to the latest cases where now that same ticket
notice has become "obviously" inadequate.15
The so-called "IATA Proposal" announced by the U.S.
State Department on May 13, 1966, and approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board I as an agreement by the carriers
to be effective May 16, 1966, in effect raised the limit of
liability to 575,000 including the costs of litigation, without
regard to fault on the part of the carrier. This "voluntary"
proposal of the carriers (through the Montreal headquarters
of IATA via Director General Sir William ]ildred and his
successor Knut Hamnmarskjold) was, of course, the result
of the tremendous ,pressure in this country 7 to either raise
the limits drastically or to "get out of the Warsaw Con-
vention";"' and more specifically it was the result of the
carriers' last-minute effort to get the United States Gov-
ernment to withdraw its November 15, 1965, six-month
notice of denunciation, 9 which was to be effective May 15,
1966.
14 See, e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 20 App. Div. 2d 454, 453, 247
N.Y.S.2d 820, 824 (1st Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203
N.E.2d 640, 255 N.Y.S2d 249 (1964); Ross v. Pan American Airways,
299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E2d 880 (1949), cert. denied sub nwn. Froman v. Pan
American Airways, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
U;Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965);
Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965); Lisi v.
Alitalia Lines, 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
1o Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1964), and the CAB Economic Regs.,
14 C.F.R. Pt. 261 (1949).
.7 For an excellent summary of the events leading up to the "Interim
Arrangement" or "Montreal Agreement' of the International Air Carriers,
through IATA (International Air Transport Association), see Hildred,
Air Carriers' Liability: Significance of the Warsaw Convention and Events
Leading Up to the Montreal Agreement, 33 J. Am L. & Com. 521 (1967).
See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, sufpra note 2, at 504-06.
Is N.Y. Times, April 18, 1959, at 22, col. 1.
29 The terms "denunciation" and "Notice of Denunciation!' do not imply
either official criticism of the Warsaw Convention by a member state nor
any flagrant disregard of its provisions. Rather, those terms are used only
in their technical sense, whereby the Convention itself sets forth the formal
means for member states to withdraw from participation in the Convention's
restrictions.
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This new "Interim Arrangement""-  has radically
changed the recovery prospects for an international air
traveller, on a fight to or from the U.S. or with a point in
the U.S. as an agreed stopping place, not only in the rais-
ing of the monetary limit but also by the addition of a new
"absolute liability" proviso. Furthermore, the "Warsaw
ticket notice" situation has also been markedly changed in
both size of print and in clear statement of "exact" mone-
taxy amounts applicable under both the new "Special Agree-
ment" and, should the passenger be travelling by a carrier
not a party to the new "Special Agreement," the U.S. dollar
limitations under the Warsaw Convention or Hague Proto-
col limits ($8,29) or $16,580), whichever is applicable.
Incidentally, this notice is in the form of a ticket-envelope
insert, rather than hidden away "in microscopic type .. .
camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions
of Contract' crowded" 21 onto the back of the ticket itself,
which the ticket agent heretofore customarily stapled, notice
underneath, inside the ticket envelope.
However, in spite of the radical changes wrought by
the present "Special Agreement" of the Interim Arrange-
ment, the rationalizations used by American courts, in the
closing years of universal Warsaw Convention limitation
applicability, should remain of interest for the international
lawyer, not just for the historical significance of those
decisions, but prospectively as well. It is the opinion of the
writer that the "Interim Arrangement" will be just that.
It cannot be a permanent solution, and as the years roll on,
in perhaps only a decade, history may very well repeat
itself-and as the "adequate" new limitation gradually be-
comes itself "out of touch with reality" in terms of national
20 A State Department statement, issued the same day as the Notice of
Denunciation, expressed the position that the United States would accept a
$75,000 limit as an "interim solution" in anticipation of a subsequent perma-
nent arrangement with a $100,000 limit. The agreement has been called the
"Montreal Agreement" by IATA and the "Warsaw Convention Liability
Agreement" by the C.A.B. C.A.B. Press Release No. 66-77, June 9, 1966.
For full text of the agreement, see C.A.B. Agreement No. 18990, approved
by Order E-23680, May 13, 1966, Docket No. 17325. The agreement was
initially signed by 11 U.S. and 17 foreign air carriers. As of April 17,
1967, 42 U.S. and 21 foreign carriers had signed.2 1 Lisi v. Alitalia Lines, 253 F. Supp. 237, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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average cost-of-living, average incomes, ever-increasing judg-
ment amounts recovered in non-"Special Agreement," non-
international aviation disaster cases versus vastly increased
financial independence of all major air carriers, we may
once again hear repeated a legislator's charge of the
"felony" 22 of liability limitation by international treaty,
and a concurrent judicial exercise in treaty revision by
"re-interpretation" of the adequacy of ticket notices, size of
printing, what the conditions thereon could "possibly mean
to the average travelling man," and what the "real purpose"
of the ticket notice is.
It is with the latter consideration in mind that we
embark upon this brief survey and commentary on the
"WIarsaw ticket" cases, and what they may mean for the
future, with some recommendations for treaty provisions
that might avoid the necessity for future "judicial treaty
revisions" or judicial "clarification" of present and future
international liability limitation agreements.
Most important, the lessons revealed by the "Warsaw
ticket" cases as to the gradual evolution of judicial pro-
pensities to first uphold the spirit of an international treaty,
and then later to emasculate it, when they come to regard
it as oppressive, are valuable lessons for the future-not
only of air law-but for international space law, as well.
For our first passenger-carrying ventures into outer space
are sure to be beset by the same liability problems and the
same need for promotional protection and artificially-im-
posed limitations on liability, as were our early infant
international airline ventures. Here, then, is a golden op-
portunity for us to profit from the mistakes and pitfalls of
the past, as illustrated by the "Warsaw ticket" cases, and
to acknowledge the folly of foregoing the appropriate treaty-
amending process until, in effect, it is being attempted,
clumsily, by individual local, domestic courts on an ad hoc
basis. Certainly, our international space treaties will be
only as effective as the extent to which local courts will give
support to them-as is the case for our international avia-
tion treaties.
22 Letter from Senator Homer Capehart to IGIA, November 10, 1961,
expressing his dissatisfaction with the Warsaw Convention limitation.
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Tian WARSAW CoNvuNmr~N AND ITs TimmEY 1PHELD
onstruing the Treaty "So As to Accomplish its Obvious
Purposes"
In the famous "Jane Froman case," 23 the highest court
in New York affirmed the application of limited liability to
a Warsaw Convention ticket issue, against claims that due
to the unusual nature of the ticket delivery (delivery not
to "Jane Froman" but to the U.S.O. troupe manager) the
Convention limitation should be avoided. The rationale in
the opinion is interesting as it shows wholehearted support
for the "obvious purposes" of the .Convention and, while
remembering that this was a 1949 decision, sets up an
interesting comparison with subsequent opinions over ten
years later that strained to avoid the Convention limitation
in any way possible, but most specifically with the "deliv-
ery" aspects of the ticket. In the opinion of the author, had
this case come up for decision in the mid-1960's, it undoubt-
edly would have been decided exactly contrary (certainly
so in the federal courts). From Judge Desmond's opinion:
The Convention itself does not say, nor does appellant argue, that
the language of article 3 makes physical delivery of the ticket into
the passenger's own hand a requisite for the limitation of liability.
But, says appellant, there must be delivery to someone authorized
by the passenger to take, for the passenger, delivery of a ticket
expressing the limitation-and Abraham, says appellant, was never
commissioned by her to receive a ticket for her and never licensed
to accept, for her but without her knowledge, a ticket which by its
terms, and because of its points of departure and return, put into
operation against her although unknown to her, the drastic restric-
tions of the Warsaw Convention.2 4
The facts were summarized as follows:
[Alt the airport, Abraham 'lined up all the performers' in front
of desks and 'placed in front of each his or her passport and ticket';
defendant's clerks tore off from each ticket the New York-to-
Lisbon stub, and passed the rest of the tickets and the passports
23Ross v. Pan American Airways, 299 N.Y. 88, 85 N.E.2d 880 (1949),
cert. denied sub norn. Froman v. Pan American Airways, 349 U.S. 947
(1955).2
4 Id. at 95-96, 85 N.E.2d at 884.
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along the desk at which were seated customs inspectors, the per-
formers likewise moving along in front of these desks as their
tickets and passports were passed down the line; at the end of the
line of desks the tickets and passports were handed back to
Abraham, who held them until the plane's impending departure
was signalled, when he put in the hands of each performer her
passport and a slip of paper (not the ticket itself) admitting her
to the plane; Abraham gave the tickets to another U.S.O. Camp
Shows, Inc., employee or representative, who boarded the plane
but was killed in the crash, the tickets being lost.25
With the delivery *of the ticket to appellant placed
squarely in issue, coupled with facts showing clearly that
appellant had not only not been handed her tickets nor had
she ever touched them, the evidence also disclosed that up
to the time of the crash they were never in her possession
-not even after she boarded the plane. In view of the
state of the evidence before it, the court's next quoted state-
ment shows the lengths to which courts would then go to
uphold the "obvious purposes" of the treaty:
Whether or not all this added up, as a matter of law, to a sufficient
showing of authority in Abraham, it can hardly be disputed that,
when a ticket bearing appellant's name and all particulars as to the
intended route as well as a reference to the Warsaw Convention
limitation, was in front of appellant on the table in the airport,
she, by thereafter boarding the plane as a traveler on that ticket,
impliedly, if not expressly, ratified and adopted what had been done
by the Army, and later by Abraham, in taking out that ticket in
her name.
Thus, the special, and undisputed, facts in these affidavits make
impossible, as matter of law, any finding other than that the ticket
was "delivered", and so it was right to hold that the top limit of
recovery was $8,219.87.21
Even more interesting, in view of later decisions, is the
court's discussion of the purposes of the Warsaw Conven-
tion's limitation versus ticket "delivery" requirements, and
the absence of any necessity for individual (versus High
25 Id. at 95, 85 N.E2d at 883 (emphasis added).
20 Id. at 96, 85 N.E.2d at 884 (emphasis added).
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Contracting Parties) assent to the liability limitation for
its existence and validity:
Plaintiff, of course, was presumed to know the law and was bound
thereby. Furthermore, while the Convention speaks of transporta-
tion under a 'contract' and requires delivery of a ticket warning of
the limitation, it is plain that the limitation is one created by the
Convention itself, and is not the product of consensual arrange-
ments between the parties. .... Parenthetically, we note that under
New York cases and cases elsewhere, even where the limitation is
purely contractual, acceptance of a transoceanic ticket stating the
limitation 'gives rise to an implication of assent' whether the ticket
be read by the passenger or not. . . [T]his treaty, like any other
statute, must be construed reasonably and so as to accomplish its
obvious purposes ...
Those aims would be poorly served by any holding that the
limitation of liability is available only when a carrier can produce
affirmative proof not only that the passenger ticket complied with
the Convention, but that the individual who bought that ticket at
the carrier's ticket counter, was the passenger himself or someone
specifically authorized by' the passenger to consent, on the latter's
behalf, to limit liability."
Lest the remarks prefacing this quoted ,passage from
Judge Desmond's decision mislead the reader as to this
writer's position, I am of the firm opinion that the kind of
support given here to applicability of the Warsaw Conven-
tion is absolutely essential to the universal acceptance of
any international treaty, and that the later cases gradually
watering down the almost automatic applicability of the
Convention limitation unfortunately misconstrued the intent
and purposes of the international representatives at the
Convention. To be sure, this later misinterpretation was
done for a humanitarian purpose--to effect relief from what
had become an overly oppressive, archaic and unnecessarily
low maximum limit of recovery. However, the appropriate
remedy should have been an actual change in the interna-
tional agreement itself by the parties thereto. (Concededly,
the change that ultimately did take place was not accom-
plished as an amendment to Warsaw, but by a waiver agree-
ment among the international air carriers affected thereby.)
2
7Id. at 97-98, 85 N.E.2d at 885-86.
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To put it another way, there would seem to be basic legal
and ethical objections to the local judiciary of one member
international state in effect emasculating or "amending" a
treaty by the application of the strained logic of "re-inter-
pretation." Certainly we would be the first to complain if
our United States air carriers were suddenly to be "hit"
by a series of huge liability judgments in a foreign land by
the sheer "re-interpretation" of the Warsaw Convention by
local courts in that foreign land eliminating limitation pro-
visions. The fact that a lifting of the limits proved to be
socially desirable does not erase the questionable procedure
of local, domestic courts "amending" treaty provisions and
re-evaluating treaty intentions. To the extent that our
courts hold such treaties "sacred," only to that extent are
our American businesses reciprocally protected. Of course,
it appears that the rapidly developing course of events in
this country, highlighted by the "hardship" decisions adher-
ing to the Convention's limitations, gave impetus to the
eventual official change of position on the desirability of
continued U.S. participation with such low limits. Mean-
while, however, by the time our State Department went
through the more appropriate procedure of Notice of De-
nunciation, conferences and negotiations with affected
parties, agreements on compromise, and subsequent re-ad-
herence to the Convention, our American courts had already
worked out some "compromises" of their own.
aTechnical OmissioWs" Fron, Warsaw Ticket o Barrier
to the Linitation
In spite of the clear requirement of Article 3(1) (c) of
the Warsaw Convention, the United States -Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit refused, in 1955, to avail itself of the
golden opportunity to avoid the operation of the Convention
limitation by citing the absence from the ticket of the
"agreed stopping places." Obviously, the prevailing judi-
cial mood was then still one of abiding by the Convention.
In Grey v. American Airline Inc., 8 the court had a
case before it arising from the crash, at Love Field, Dallas,
28 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Texas, of an international flight, an American Airlines'
Douglas DC-6 on a scheduled flight from New York to
Mexico City, via Washington, D.C. and Dallas. The par-
ents of the infant plaintiffs and twenty-six persons, also
passengers, were killed in that crash on November 29, 1949.
On the ticket issue, the court stated briefly:
While plaintiffs contended that the Warsaw Convention was not
applicable, because the passenger tickets issued to decedents did
not make reference to the intermediate 'agreed stopping places' of
Washington, D.C., and Dallas, Texas, motions to strike the usual
Warsaw Convention limitation of liability defenses, based upon this
technical and wholly unsubstantial alleged omission, were denied
before trial by Judge Noonan. We agree with Judge Noonan's
reasoning and see no occasion to elaborate upon his carefully pre-
pared opinion.2 9
The Ticket Does Not Leave the Passenger in the Dark
Although Seth v. British Overseas Airways Corpora-
tion 11 was a baggage liability case, language in the opinion
indicates that as late as March 1964, some federal courts
still had the attitude that the vague statements on the back
of the ticket, referring the uninitiated traveller to the War-
saw Convention for the carrier's limitation on liability for
loss, gave the passenger "fair warning":
Seth's main contention is that the statement on the passenger ticket
that: 'Carriage hereunder is subject to the rules and limitations
relating to liability established by the Convention for the Unifica-
tion, of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air,
signed at Warsaw, October 12, 1929 (hereinafter called "the Con-
vention"), unless such carriage is not "international carriage" as
defined by the Convention,' does not constitute compliance with
sub-paragraph (h) of Article 4(3), supra, requiring: 'A statement
that the transportation is subject to the rules relating to liability
established by this convention.' The argument in a nutshell is that
the 'unless' clause destroys what otherwise would constitute compli-
ance with sub-paragraph (h) because considered as a whole the
statement on the ticket does not categorically inform the passenger
that his transportation is subject to the Convention.
2D Id. at 284 (emphasis added).
30 329 F.2d 302 (lst Cir. 1964).
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We do note agree.
The statement on the ticket quoted above gives the passenger clear
notice that limitations on the carrier's liability for the loss of
checked baggage are provided by the Warsaw Convention and that
the carrier will avail itself of those limitations if it can. The ticket
does not leave the passenger in the dark as to a hidden risk he
might not appreciate. It gives him. fair warning of the existence of
limitations on the carrier's liability which he can avoid only on
showing that the carriage undertaken by the carrier is not 'inter-
national carriage' as defined in the Warsaw Convention.3 1
A OHINX IN THE ARMOR
Ee1 kv. United Arab Airlines, In. 32 was a New York State
case that once again reaffirmed, as late as March 1961, the
by then accepted rule of support for the intended provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, in spite of any individual hard-
ships it might entail. However, in a footnote certain catch-
phrases appeared which were to later find their way into
opinions of federal courts not so inclined to support the
Convention.
It is true, for example, that the language on the ticket which states
that the Warsaw Convention may be applicable is regretfully
abstruse and terse, and no doubt quite uninformative to most trav-
ellers. This assumes that the Lilliputian typography of the ticket
addendum allows of any communication. It is legally sufficient,
however, under the terms of the Warsaw Convention. 33
THn WALL is BEAciaO D
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc1 " arose from the
crash of an airliner that had been chartered by the Air
Force to transport military personnel and military cargo
from Travis Air Force Base, San Francisco, to Tachikawa
Air Force Base, Tokyo, Japan. On the first claim of excep-
tion to the Convention, the court held that this was not
31Id. at 306-07 (emphasis added).
32 Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 20 App. Div. 2d 454, 247 N.Y.S.2d
820 (lst Dep't), rev'd on otlhr grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640,
255 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1964).
3320 App. Div. 2d 454, 457 n.2, 247 N.Y.S2d 820, 824 n.2 (emphasis
added).
34341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
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transportation performed by the United States, but was for
the United States, and therefore on that ground alone the
Convention would still be applicable. However, on the
question of delivery of the "Warsaw ticket," the facts
showed that Lt. Mertens, plaintiffs' decedent, was not given
his ticket until after he boarded the plane. The court held
that delivery of the ticket was not adequate as a matter of
law and that the Convention limitation on damages was
therefore not applicable. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in its unanimous decision, also stated:
We read Article 3(2) to require that the ticket be delivered to the
passenger in such a manner as to afford him a reasonable oppor-
tunity to take measures to protect himself against the limitation of
liability. Such self-protective measures, could consist of, for ex-
ample, deciding not to take the flight, entering a special contract
with the carrier, or taking out additional insurance for the flight....
We also base our conclusion on the fact . . . that the statement
concerning the limitation of liability was printed in such a manner
as to virtually be both unnoticeable and unreadable, especially in an
aircraft about to take off. Under all these circumstances it could
not be said that Lieutenant Mertens had a reasonable opportunity
to take any, measures to protect himself against the limitation of
liability. . ..-- '
Thus, with Mertens we have the first breakthrough,
shattering the wall of judicial respect for the Convention's
liability limitations. Furthermore, it enunciated new
"rules" which would enable other courts to find it easier to
abrogate the Convention's restrictions. Each case could
now be tested on its facts to determine whether the pas-
senger's ticket had been "delivered in such a manner as to
afford a reasonable opportunity" for the passenger to pro-
tect himself independently of the 'Convention limitation and
presumption of liability. Additionally, now a decision as
to applicability or non-applicability of the Convention's
limitations could also be couched in terms of the readability
of the printing on the ticket. (This, now, in disregard of
the fact that the notice on the ticket had been relatively
standard, without deviation, with literally millions of such
35 Id. at 856-57 (emphasis added).
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identical tickets issued prior to the date of this decision.)
Consider also the fact that both the original Article 3 of
the Convention and the amended Article 3 of the Warsaw
Convention Protocol still contained the statement: "The
absence, irregularity or loss of the passenger ticket does not
affect the existence or validity of the contract of carriage
which shall nonetheless, be subject to the rules of this
Convention." 36 Collaterally, by the time of the Mertens
decision, public and Congressional doubt as to the propriety
of the Warsaw limitation had already been building to seri-
ous proportions and consideration was already being given
to the possibility of the United States abrogating the War-
saw Convention (the incipient pressure starting most sig-
nificantly as early as 1949 resulting from the celebrated
"Jane Froman case").
Not surprisingly, the Mertens decision was followed
shortly thereafter by the decision of another circuit also
eliminating the Convention's applicability, also based on the
manner of delivery of the ticket, and also alluding to the
readability of the ticket's Warsaw notice. The Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in Warren. v. Flying Tiger lines,
Tn c., 37 stated:
In March, 1962, an aircraft owned and operated by Flying
Tiger, disappeared enroute from Travis Air Force Base, California
to Vietnam. The plane was under charter to the United States Air
Force ...
An issue common to all cases is whether the so-called
Warsaw Convention . . . applies to limit Flying Tiger's liability
to $8,300 for each person killed....
The passengers on this flight were selected exclusively by MATS.
On the morning in question each serviceman so selected appeared
at the MATS window at Travis Air Force Base and displayed his
orders. Each was given a MATS boarding pass and a MATS
claim check. The servicemen then went to the boarding gate
where they were checked through by military personnel....
On the front of the boarding tickets passed out by the Flying Tiger
stewardess at the foot of the ramp, however, it was stated that the
transportation was 'subject to the rules relating to liability estab-
36 Warsaw Convention, opem for signature, Oct. 29, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
3001, 3015 (English Translation).
37 352 F2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
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lished by the Convention... if such transportation is "international
transportation" as defined by said Convention.' There were also
conditions referring to the Convention printed on the back of the
boarding tickets. However, as the trial court found, it would be
difficult for one to read the fine print on the back of these tickets
without a magnifying glass ...
None of the passengers were afforded a reasonable opportunity of
even reading the tickets, much less obtaining additional insurance,
before they were accepted by boarding the plane. The passengers
were thereby deprived of a right which was intended to be afforded
them as a concomitant to the carrier's right to limit its liability....
We regard as immaterial the fact that the passengers could
have purchased additional flight insurance at Honolulu. They had
already been accepted as passengers without an adequate delivery
of tickets having been made. Before boarding the plane at Travis
they were entitled to adequate notice which would have enabled
them to purchase additional insurance covering the entire flight.38
A year later, in Lisi v. Alitalia,9 a federal district
court summarized the now fully-developed judicial objec-
tions to the "Warsaw ticket":
The Warsaw Convention specifies that the provisions of the Con-
vention which exclude or limit airline's liability are unavailable
unless the airline delivers a passenger ticket and baggage check.
The Convention also requires that the ticket and check contain
'(a) statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relat-
ing to liability established by this convention.' Read together, the
intent of these requirements is to afford the passenger a reasonable
opportunity to take measures to protect himself against the airline's
exclusion or limitation of its liability. . ..
We hold, therefore, that compliance with the Convention requires
not mere physical delivery of a ticket and check before departure
but delivery of a ticket and check which notify the passenger that
the provisions of the Convention which exclude or limit liability
are applicable. . . Thus, if the tickets and checks issued here did
not so notify the passenger, the challenged affirmative defenses
are unavailable and must be dismissed.40
The footnotes printed in microscopic type at the bottom of the
outside front cover and [ticket] coupons, as well as condition 2(a)
camouflaged in Lilliputian print in a thicket of 'Conditions of Con-
tract' crowded on page 4, are both unnoticeable and unreadable.
Indeed, the exculpatory statements on which defendant relies are
n8 Id. at 495, 496, 497, 498.
89253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
40 Id. at 239 (empbasis added).
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virtually invisible. They are ineffectively positioned, diminutively
sized, and unemphasized by bold face type, contrasting color, or
anything else. The simple truth is that they are so artfully camou-
flaged that their presence is concealed.
'Lilliputian typography' . . . which must be read through 'a
magnifying glass,' ... is at war with the intent of the Convention.41
The Lis! decision was affirmed l by a divided Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in an opinion which contained
the following interesting language:
It is apparent that Alitalia relies on a literal reading of the Con-
vention for its assertions. We reject the interpretation it urges
upon us. While it is true that the language of the Convention is
relevant to our decision it must not become, as Justice Frankfurter
stated it, a 'verbal prison.' 43
The language in the dissent was equally interesting:
The majority in their opinion indulge in judicial treaty-making.
The language of the treaty (referred to as the Warsaw Conven-
tion) is clear. Its provisions are not difficult to comprehend. Its
mandates are simply stated. Ascertainment of compliance should,
therefore, present no real problem....
The majority do not approve of the terms of the treaty and,
therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it. . . .The original limita-
tions in the Convention may well be outmoded by now. Substan-
tial revisions upward have been made but they have been made,
as they should be, by treaty and not by the courts. Judicial
predilections for their own views as to limitation of liability should
not prevail over the limitations fixed by the legislative and execu-
tive branches of Government even though this result is obtained by
ostensibly adding to the treaty a requirement of actual understand-
ing notice."
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed Lis! "by an equally divided Court." 45
As far as this country's courts have gone to extirpate
the Warsaw Convention limitation in recent years, none,
however, have gone as far as plaintiff-appellant in Berguido
-1 Id. at 243 (emphasis added).
42370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
431d. at 511.
"Id. at 515.
45 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc." would have them go. In that
case plaintiff argued that not only did the Convention limi-
tation not apply to his claim, but that, at one and the same
time, he was entitled to "absolute and unlimited liability
without fault" on the part of the defendant carrier by vir-
tue of that same Convention.
The defendant airline had pleaded the Warsaw Con-
vention limitation of $8,300, but plaintiff urged that a
theory of absolute and unlimited liability should apply due
to an alleged failure of the airline to comply with Article
3(1) of the Convention." Plaintiff argued that article
17 " provided for such unlimited absolute liability unless a
carrier proves he has complied with article 3 (1) by actual
delivery of an adequate ticket to decedent showing all
agreed stopping places and the Convention's limitation of
liability provisions. An attempt was also made by plaintiff
to show inadequacy of the ticket. (The "absolute" liability
aspect became important to plaintiff on appeal as the trial
court had found that the defendant had been guilty of
neither willful misconduct nor even simple negligence, and
accordingly had entered judgment against defendant for
$8,300 pursuant to Warsaw.) The Third Circuit, however,
dismissed plaintiff-appellant's appeal (addressed to the
4369 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 996 (1968).
47 Warsaw Convention, open for signature, Oct. 29, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
3001, 3015 (English Translation):
1. For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a
passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:(a) the place and date of issue;
(b) the place of departure and of destination;
(c) the agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may reserve
right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity, and that
if he exercises that right the alterations shall not have the effect
of depriving the transportation of its international character;
d) the name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) a statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating
to liability established by this Convention.
4s Warsaw Convention, open for signature, Oct. 29, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
.3001, 3015 (English Translation), Chap. III, "Liability of the Carrier":
Article 17-The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
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amount of judgment-plaintiff sought $375,000 instead of
the 8,300 awarded below). The court found, with Judge
Kalodner dissenting, that article 17 gave no indication of
the extent of the carrier's liability, that it must be read
with article 22(1) " and that so analyzed it would not sup-
port a theory of absolute unlimited liability as being a
penalty for a failure to comply with the technical Conven-
tion requirements regarding the ticket, its adequacy or
delivery. 0 Stated another way, the court ruled that if non-
compliance with the requirements of the Convention had
been proved, so as to remove the carrier from protection of
the Convention, the plaintiff is then still left with the bur-
den of proving negligence, although the amount of recovery
would then be unlimited. Judge Kalodner's dissent attacked
the adequacy of the form of Warsaw notice given with a
passenger's ticket,51 citing the Lisi district court decision
with approval.
It might indeed be a novel precept to many interna-
tional lawyers, and international "tHigh Contracting Par-
ties" as well, if the implied doctrine of Mertens, Warren
and isi were to gain general acceptance, namely, that
henceforth the validity and binding effect of an interna-
tional treaty duly enacted into domestic law by the "High
Contracting Parties" shall depend upon whether or not the
individual citizen later sought to be held to its terms had
actual personal knowledge of the treaty or carried on his
immediate person a complete and easily readable copy of
19Warsaw Convention, open for signature, Oct. 29, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
3006, 3019 (English Translation), Article 22(1):
In the carriage of persons the liability of the carrier for each pas-
senger is limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance
with the law of the court to which the case is submitted damages
may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent
capital value of the said payments shall not exceed 125,000 francs.
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may
agree to a higher limit of liability.
GO 369 F.2d at 879.
51 Id. at 886.
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the pertinent portions of said treaty.52  The potential effect
on space law is even more interesting. It would appear
that, if our astronauts and the Russians are to be mutually,
bound and reciprocally benefitted by any present and future
space treaties, we should insist that the Russian astronauts
carry with them, in addition to their portable air-condition-
ing unit and liquid food bottles, a briefcase containing the
currently effective outer space treaties of the world (in
clearly legible, understandable, and easily readable form, of
course).
In visually comparing the new "Special Agreement"
ticket insert with the old Warsaw Convention ticket notice
it can readily be seen that several of the classic judicial
objections to the form of the notice have been eliminated.
The size of the print is no longer "miniscule," the volume
of verbiage is considerably reduced, the fact that the notice
concerns a limitation of liability is clearly stated in large,
headline-style, capitalized print, and the exact monetary
amounts of the limitations are clearly expressed in U.S.
dollars. However, analyzing the background of the Warsaw
ticket cases a little more deeply than that, few lawyers
would conclude that such changes are in reality a perma-
nent cure for the underlying problem, as few would con-
clude that those original judicial objections as to the "form
of the printing" constituted the true sine qua non of the
52 See also Berquido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 369 F.2d 874, 886 (3d
Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion), wherein Judge Kalodner argues that he
would not uphold the Warsaw Convention limitation even if the ticket
notice had -been "printed in readily discernible manner."
An even more startling judicial view -was expressed recently in a state
court case:
The Court further finds that the provisions of the Warsaw Convention
Treaty which would restrict damages in this case to approximately
$8,300 are unconstitutional and therefore not enforceable because they
violate the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States Constitution. The Court finds that such provisions are arbitrary,
irresponsible, capricious and indefensible as applied to this case, in that
such provisions would attempt to impose a damage limitation of
conliderably less than the undisputed pecuniary losses and damages
involved in this case. Such unjustifiable, preferential treatment of
airlines is unconstitutional. The Court finds that such preferential
discrimination to airlines does not apply to manufacturers or even
to the United States Government.
Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., (Ill. Cr. Ct, Nov. 7, 1968)
(unreported), commented on in 12 PEns. INJ. NmvsL. 111-12 (1968).
[ VOL. 43
THE WARSAW TICKET
essential problem. The genesis of the problem was socio-
economic. Therefore, remedies for the future should look
to flexibility in providing for just such socio-economic
changes, if international treaties are to have any lasting
effect, and if they are to be universally respected and
enforced.
SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS COULD AFEcT FUTURE SPACE
TRANSPORTATION TREATIES
We turn now to consider the possibility that future
courts interpreting future "Warsaw-type" treaties in the
field of international outer space transportation, might be
tempted to repeat the exercise of our just-discussed "War-
saw limitation" cases.5 3
Just as air law, to a certain extent, evolved from the
principles of the law of the sea, so in all probability space
law will be a further development of air law. Conse-
quently, any general problems experienced in international
air transportation law may well re-arise during the evolu-
tionary stage of space transport law.5 Although the Soviet
and American legal systems have been a retreat from the
absolute liability theory in aviation damage cases, the gen-
eral tendency of the world's legal systems has been to
impose strict liability when the damage is caused by
what society deems to be "ultrahazardous" activity." And
there can be little doubt that space exploration is today
generally considered to be a type of activity involving an
O We are here, of course, not considering at all the problems and
arrangements between States concerning liability for State-operated space
flights and resultant damage. As to that subject we might here just
parenthetically note that the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has already agreed to the United States'
proposal that the International Court of Justice should be given jurisdiction
to decide disputes between States as to liability for injury or damage
caused by space vehicles. Lyon, Space Vehicles, Satellites Md the Law,
7 McGru L. J. 271 (1961), quoted in D. Birmyou, Am LAW 332 (2d ed.
1964).54 See A. HA.=Y, SPAcE LAW Az' Govmm mmr 42, 57, 58, 86, 87 (1963).
See also Hildred, Dedication to the Menwry of John Cobb Cooper, 33 J.
Am L. & Com. 526, 527 (1967).
5 5 Haley, supra note 54, at 263.
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unusual risk of harm to the public." This being the case,
there can be little doubt that when the time comes for
individual entrepreneurs to venture into the field of outer
space transportation, without the almost unlimited financial
resources of the international space power governments
available to protect them, once again a treaty limiting lia-
bility will be seriously proposed. Such a treaty would no
doubt encompass both surface damage to third persons and
space vehicle passenger injury/death situations.
Should such space transportation treaties come about,
undoubtedly the liability limitations incorporated would
have only temporary correlation to the economics of the
average victim's reasonable requirements. Again, the
strong lobbying pressures of the transportation interests
involved would continually oppose and retard any official
international change in the maximum limits once estab-
lished under the then-effective treaty. Voila! The courts
again would see themselves as the only realistic solution
-via artificial technicality-searching on an ad hoc basis, in
an "interpretive" search for "substantial justice."
RECOMMENDATIONS:
MECHANICALLY OPERATIVE TREATY PRovIsIoNs
ON LIABILITY LIMITS
The following recommendations or suggestions for add-
ing flexibility to the portions of international treaties pre-
scribing fixed maximum monetary liability limits are
intended only as a starting point in the direction of con-
sidering the practical feasibility of injecting some workable
system of change into an area of such treaties where, by
the inherent nature of the subject matter, change is inevi-
table. Certainly many other bases than those recommended
can be imagined that would be as simple, at least as work-
able, just as objectively determinable, and yield the desired
56M. at 264. (This opinion should, of course, be compared with the
statistical record of extremely little surface damage to date from space
ventures.)
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flexibility in the area where the treaty must remain com-
paratively fluid if the treaty is to have lasting effect. It is
submitted that the suggested approaches could have applica-
tion in both present international aviation treaties and in
future international outer space treaties as well, after we
have progressed beyond the space exploration stage into the
space transportation era.
Two alternative procedures are suggested, together with
an independent recommendation that could be effective,
additionally, along with whichever basic alternative proce-
dure is used. The first alternative would be for a provision
within the treaty itself (as by an additional protocol to the
Warsaw Convention, or in the case of a new space trans-
portation treaty, by inclusion in the basic agreement itself)
providing for an "automatic" re-convening of a treaty-
amending commission limited to consideration of amending
the maximum liability limits "immediately" upon the occur-
rence of certain economic guideline factors. "Immediately,"
of course, could be defined to be the next regularly sched-
uled meeting of the "Assembly" or other sovereign govern,
ing body of the organization, or at the next annual meeting
of the sovereign body, or at a special meeting of the treaty-
amending commission itself to be scheduled "no later than
six months after the occcurrence" of the events programmed
in the economic guideline factors. However, the important
feature is that it would be compulsory that the treaty-
amending commission submit to the sovereign body a pro.
posed amendment to the liability limitation figure duly
based upon an evaluation of the predetermined economic
guideline factors. This proposed treaty amendment would
then receive priority consideration on the agenda at the
next meeting of the sovereign body, and a general vote
upon it would then also be mandatory.
Inherent in the mechanics of this proposal, and also in
the one to follow, would be the establishment of a perma-
nent economics commission with the duty of compiling and
maintaining current statistics yielding the key "economic
guideline factors" that would trigger the action in these
two alternative proposals. The permanent economics com-
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mission would necessarily have the concomitant power to
demand production of statistical information on a regular
basis from all "High Contracting Parties" with which to
maintain currency on the occurrence or non-occurrence of
the key triggering factors.
The second alternative appears to be more simple, yet
upon further analysis may prove to be more difficult upon
which to get universal agreement, precisely for the reason
that it is "too simple, too automatic." However, in the
interest of provoking more thought upon the subject and as
a challenge for international lawyers to originate more
adaptable, more universally acceptable alternatives, let us
consider it for a moment. Using virtually the same key
"economic guideline factors" as in the first alternative, we
might use the occurrence of a certain predetermined sub-
stantial change in those guideline factors to trigger an
"automatic amendment" of the treaty itself by an automatic
change (theoretically, up or down) in the maximum mone-
tary limits of liability, pursuant to a formula to be em-
bodied in the treaty itself (or a protocol thereto), much as
the cost of living index, consumer price index, or local pre-
vailing wage rates are used as key triggering factors today
in many large industrial union contracts 7 and in certain
areas of government employment (e.g., Federal "Wage
Board" employees)." As mentioned in the prior proposal,
the constant monitoring of the key "economic guideline fac-
tors" by a permanent economics commission created for that
purpose would be a prerequisite to both proposals. In the
case of this second proposal, however, certain legal mechan-
ics would have to be devised whereby an evaluation, deter-
mination and announcement by the economics commission
would "automatically" amend the monetary amounts speci-
fied in the treaty to the extent reported necessary by the
commission, after a certain stipulated time period had
elapsed from the announcement date. The purpose of the
stipulated time period after announcement would be to
57 Deferred Wage Increase & Escalator Clauses, DE'T LAB. BuI..
No. 1425-4 (Jan. 1966).
" Civ. SEmv. Comm. FE. PEso x, MAuALch. 532.
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allow a reasonable time for challenge and counterstudy by
any interested "High Contracting Party." After a chal-
lenge had been duly filed, the "automatic" feature of the
amendment could be postponed by majority vote of the
"Assembly" but with a definite scheduled date for a general
vote on the validity of the conclusion of the permanent
economics commission in light of the conflicting evidence
produced by the challenger.
In both of the above alternative proposals the arbitrary
standards to be monitored could be any or all of the follow-
ing, or others as they may appear to directly relate to the
"hardship" or "unrealistic" aspects of whatever happens to
be the current maximum monetary liability limitations. In
any event, a predetermined minimum percentage change
would be required to trigger the actions referred to in the
proposal, and the base year for computing relative changes
would be the year of the latest change to the liability limi-
tation figures in the treaty itself.
Key Economic Guideline Factors
1. Average cost of living per capita in state having
highest cost of living;
2. Average annual income per capita in state having
the highest per capita income;
3. Actuarial computation of the average monetary
value of a human life to dependent survivors in the
state having the highest standard of living;
4. Size of the gap between non-limitation case recov-
eries against carriers and limitation case recoveries;
5. Relationship between actual liability exposure ex-
perience of carriers and their gross revenues, net
revenues, gross operating costs, net operating costs,
and insurance rates.
The reason for using the base figures as those from the
state having the highest cost of living, highest annual
income, etc., is that such a state would be the first to feel
the hardship or "unrealistic" aspect of an outdated liability
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limitation. At the same time, states not nearly so well
situated would not be adversely affected by an upward
change in the maximum monetary limitation because in the
economic nature of things their exposure experience (i.e.,
their carriers') should be greatest "at home," wherein legal
recoveries could be expected to be, on the average, well
below the maximum of the new liability limits. This con-
siders that their area of maximum operations would encom-
pass their own territory and their own nationals. Of
course, to the extent that they "go where the money is,"
their exposure will increase but so will their revenue, and
their capacity to respond to larger judgments.
An additional recommendation, independent of the fore-
going two alternatives, is that a sort of limited international
court be created to decide questions of interpretation of the
prevailing liability limitation treaty. As we have seen in
our review of the series of Warsaw ticket cases, local courts
are not bashful about volunteering their own versions of
what the treaty-creators "really meant," even to the point of
sterilizing the obvious protective intent of the liability limi-
tation portions of a treaty. If there were an international
judicial commission directly related to the treaty-making
organization itself to which interested parties could turn
for an authoritative pronouncement on questions of treaty
interpretation, this might forestall or preclude purely local,
domestic courts from giving their interpretations to the
point of completely removing benefits from parties designed
to be protected by that treaty.
To the foregoing extent, the author would recommend
that a "disputes clause" be enacted as part of the treaty
limiting carrier liability. This clause would provide for
mandatory arbitration or judicial decision by the interna-
tional judicial council in all cases involving treaty interpre-
tation, and this procedure would be available, not just
between "states," but also to any international carrier of a
member state who alleges that the attempted interpretation
of a treaty by a local domestic court will substantially pre-
judice its rights to protection or benefits under that treaty.
Accordingly, provision would be made that the domestic law
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of all member states shall provide that such interpretive
decisions of the international judicial council shall be ac-
corded judicial notice and "full faith and credit" in all the
courts of the land in all lawsuits, public and private.
CONCLUSION
No portion of a treaty, or any other type of law for
that matter, can be expected to remain permanently satis-
factory if it specifies ficced monetary figures as the basis for
reasonable reimbursement for the economic consequences of
accidental death or injuries. Accordingly, it has been sug-
gested herein that some more flexible formula be embodied
either in the treaty itself or in some viable, workable treaty-
amending procedure. The reciprocal benefits to be had from
the universal recognition of the sanctity of international
treaties dictate that we not allow, by default, treaties to be
sterilized or "amended" by the ad hoc decisional law of local
domestic courts.
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